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Abstract
We show that in modeling social interaction, particu-
larly dialogue, the attitude of obligation can be a useful
adjunct to the popularly considered attitudes of belief,
goal, and intention and their mutual and shared coun-
terparts. In particular, we show how discourse obliga-
tions can be used to account in a natural manner for
the connection between a question and its answer in
dialogue and how obligations can be used along with
other parts of the discourse context to extend the cov-
erage of a dialogue system.
Motivation
Most computational models of discourse are based pri-
marily on an analysis of the intentions of the speakers
(e.g.,
[Cohen and Perrault, 1979, Allen and Perrault, 1980,
Grosz and Sidner, 1986]). An agent has certain goals,
and communication results from a planning process to
achieve these goals. The speaker will form intentions
based on the goals and then act on these intentions,
producing utterances. The hearer will then reconstruct
a model of the speaker’s intentions upon hearing the
utterance. This approach has many strong points, but
does not provide a very satisfactory account of the ad-
herence to discourse conventions in dialogue.
For instance, consider one simple phenomena: a ques-
tion is typically followed by an answer, or some explicit
statement of an inability or refusal to answer. The in-
tentional story account of this goes as follows. From
the production of a question by Agent B, Agent A rec-
ognizes Agent B’s goal to find out the answer, and she
adopts a goal to tell B the answer in order to be co-
operative. A then plans to achieve the goal, thereby
generating the answer. This provides an elegant ac-
count in the simple case, but requires a strong assump-
tion of co-operativeness. Agent A must adopt agent B’s
goals as her own. As a result, it does not explain why
A says anything when she does not know the answer or
when she is not predisposed to adopting B’s goals.
Several approaches have been suggested to account
for this behavior. [Litman and Allen, 1987] introduced
an intentional analysis at the discourse level in addi-
tion to the domain level, and assumed a set of con-
ventional multi-agent actions at the discourse level.
Others have tried to account for this kind of behav-
ior using social intentional constructs such as Joint in-
tentions [Cohen and Levesque, 1991] or Shared Plans
[Grosz and Sidner, 1990]. While these accounts do help
explain some discourse phenomena more satisfactorily,
they still require a strong degree of co-operativity to ac-
count for dialogue coherence, and do not provide easy
explanations of why an agent might act in cases that
do not support high-level mutual goals.
Consider a stranger approaching an agent and asking,
“Do you have the time?” It is unlikely that there is a
joint intention or shared plan, as they have never met
before. From a purely strategic point of view, the agent
may have no interest in whether the stranger’s goals
are met. Yet, typically agents will still respond in such
situations.
As another example, consider a case in which the
agent’s goals are such that it prefers that an interrogat-
ing agent not find out the requested information. This
might block the formation of an intention to inform,
but what is it that inspires the agent to respond at all?
As these examples illustrate, an account of question
answering must go beyond recognition of speaker inten-
tions. Questions do more than just provide evidence of
a speaker’s goals, and something more than adoption of
the goals of an interlocutor is involved in formulating a
response to a question.
Some re-
searchers, e.g., [Mann, 1988, Kowtko et al., 1991], as-
sume a library of discourse level actions, sometimes
called dialogue games, which encode common commu-
nicative interactions. To be co-operative, an agent must
always be participating in one of these games. So if
a question is asked, only a fixed number of activities,
namely those introduced by a question, are co-operative
responses. Games provide a better explanation of co-
herence, but still require the agents to recognize each
other’s intentions to perform the dialogue game. As a
result, this work can be viewed as a special case of the
intentional view. An interesting model is described by
[Airenti et al., 1993], which separates out the conversa-
tional games from the task-related games in a way sim-
ilar way to [Litman and Allen, 1987]. Because of this
separation, they do not have to assume co-operation
on the tasks each agent is performing, but still require
recognition of intention and co-operation at the conver-
sational level. It is left unexplained what goals motivate
conversational co-operation.
The problem with systems which impose co-
operativity in the form of automatic goal adoption is
that this makes it impossible to reason about cases in
which one might want to violate these rules, especially
in cases where the conversational co-operation might
conflict with the agent’s personal goals.
We are developing an alternate approach that takes a
step back from the strong plan-based approach. By the
strong plan-based account, we mean models where there
is a set of personal goals which directly motivates all
the behavior of the agent. While many of the intuitions
underlying these approaches seems close to right, we
claim it is a mistake to attempt to analyze this behavior
as arising entirely from the agent’s high-level goals.
We believe that people have a much more complex set
of motivations for action. In particular, much of one’s
behavior arises from a sense of obligation to behave
within limits set by the society that the agent is part of.
A model based on obligations differs from an intention-
based approach in that obligations are independent of
shared plans and intention recognition. Rather, obli-
gations are the result of rules by which an agent lives.
Social interactions are enabled by their being a suffi-
cient compatibility between the rules affecting the in-
teracting agents. One responds to a question because
this is a social behavior that is strongly encouraged as
one grows up, and becomes instilled in the agent.
Sketch of Solution
The model we propose is that an agent’s behavior is de-
termined by a number of factors, including that agent’s
current goals in the domain, and a set of obligations
that are induced by a set of social conventions. When
planning, an agent considers both its goals and obli-
gations in order to determine an action that addresses
both to the extent possible. When prior intentions and
obligations conflict, an agent generally will delay pur-
suit of its intentions in order to satisfy the obligations,
although the agent may behave otherwise at the cost of
violating its obligations. At any given time, an agent
may have many obligations and many different goals,
and planning involves a complex tradeoff between these
different factors.
Returning to the example about questions, when an
agent is asked a question, this creates an obligation to
respond. The agent does not have to adopt the goal
of answering the question as one of her personal goals
in order to explain the behavior. Rather it is a con-
straint on the actions that the agent may plan to do.
In fact, the agent might have an explicit goal not to an-
swer the question, yet still is obliged to offer a response
(e.g., consider most politicians at press conferences).
The planning task then is to satisfy the obligation of
responding to the question, without revealing the an-
swer if at all possible. In cases where the agent does
not know the answer, the obligation to respond may be
discharged by some explicit statement of her inability
to give the answer.
Obligations and Discourse Obligations
Obligations represent what an agent should do, accord-
ing to some set of norms. The notion of obligation has
been studied for many centuries, and its formal aspects
are examined using Deontic Logic. Our needs are fairly
simple, and do not require an extensive survey of the
complexities that arise in that literature. Still, the intu-
itions underlying that work will help to clarify what an
obligation is. Generally, obligation is defined in terms
of a modal operator often called permissible. An action
is obligatory if it is not permissible not to do it. An
action is forbidden if it is not permissible. An infor-
mal semantics of the operator can be given by positing
a set of rules of behavior R. An action is obligatory if
its occurrence logically follows from R, and forbidden if
its non-occurrence logically follows from R. An action
that might occur or not-occur according to R is neither
obligatory nor forbidden.
Just because an action is obligatory with respect to
a set of rules R does not mean that the agent will
perform the action. So we do not adopt the model
suggested by [Shoham and Tennenholtz, 1992] in which
agents’ behavior cannot violate the defined social laws.
If an obligation is not satisfied, then this means that
one of the rules must have been broken. We assume
that agents generally plan their actions to violate as
few rules as possible, and so obligated actions will usu-
ally occur. But when they directly conflict with the
agent’s personal goals, the agent may choose to violate
them. Obligations are quite different from and can not
be reduced to intentions and goals. In particular, an
agent may be obliged to do an action that is contrary
to his goals (for example, consider a child who has to
apologize for hitting her younger brother).
Obligations also cannot be reduced to simple expecta-
tions, although obligations may act as a source of expec-
tations. Expectations can be used to guide the action
interpretation and plan-recognition processes (as pro-
posed by [Carberry, 1990]), but expectations do not in
and of themselves provide a sufficient motivation for an
agent to perform the expected action – in many cases
there is nothing wrong with doing the unexpected or
not performing an expected action. The interpretation
of an utterance will often be clear even without coher-
ence with prior expectations. We need to allow for the
possibility that an agent has performed an action even
when this violates expectations. If an agent actually
violates obligations as well then the agent can be held
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accountable.1
Specific obligations arise from a variety of sources. In
a conversational setting, an accepted offer or a promise
will incur an obligation. Also, a command or request
by the other party will bring about an obligation to
perform the requested action. If the obligation is to
say something then we call this a discourse obligation.
Our model of obligation is very simple. We use a set
of rules that encode discourse conventions. Whenever
a new conversation act is determined to have been per-
formed, then any future action that can be inferred from
the conventional rules becomes an obligation. We use
a simple forward chaining technique to introduce obli-
gations.
Some obligation rules based on the performance of
conversation acts are summarized in Table 1. When
an agent performs a promise to perform an action, or
performs an acceptance of a suggestion or request by
another agent to perform an action, the agent obliges
itself to achieve the action in question. When another
agent requests that some action be performed, the re-
quest itself brings an obligation to address the request:
that is, either to accept it or to reject it (and make the
decision known to the requester) – the requestee is not
permitted to ignore the request. A question establishes
an obligation to answer the question. If an utterance
has not been understood, or is believed to be deficient
in some way, this brings about an obligation to repair
the utterance.
source of obligation obliged action
S1 Accept or Promise A S1 achieve A
S1 Request A S2 address Request:
accept A or reject A
S1 YNQ whether P S2 Answer-if P
S1 WHQ P(x) S2 Inform-ref x
utterance not understood repair utterance
or incorrect
Table 1: Sample Obligation Rules
Obligations and Behavior
Obligations (or at least beliefs that the agent has obli-
gations) will thus form an important part of the reason-
ing process of a deliberative agent, e.g., the architecture
proposed by [Bratman et al., 1988]. In addition to con-
sidering beliefs about the world, which will govern the
1[McRoy, 1993] uses expectations derived from Adja-
cency Pair structure [Schegloff and Sacks, 1973], as are
many of the discourse obligations considered in this paper.
These expectations correspond to social norms and do im-
pose the same notion of accountability. However, the anal-
ysis there is oriented towards discovering misconceptions
based on violated expectations, and the alternative possibil-
ity of violated obligations is not considered in the utterance
recognition process, nor allowed in the utterance production
process.
possibility of performing actions and likelyhood of suc-
cess, and desires or goals which will govern the utility
or desirability of actions, a social agent will also have
to consider obligations, which govern the permissibil-
ity of actions.
There are a large number of strategies which
may be used to incorporate obligations into the
deliberative process, based on how much weight
they are given compared to the agents goals.
[Conte and Castelfranchi, 1993] present several strate-
gies of moving from obligations to actions, including:
automatically performing an obligated action, adopting
all obligations as goals, or adopting an obligated action
as a goal only when performing the action results in a
state desired by the agent. In the latter cases, these
goals still might conflict with other goals of the agent,
and so are not guaranteed to be performed.
In general, we will want to allow action based on obli-
gations to supersede performance of intended actions.
For instance, consider an agent with an intention to do
something as soon as possible. If an obligation is im-
posed, it will still be possible to perform the intended
action, but a well-behaved agent might need to delay
performance until the obligation is dealt with. For ex-
ample, if the intention is to perform a series of inform
acts, and then a listener requests repair of one, a well-
behaved agent will repair that inform before proceeding
to initiate the next intended one.
Using Discourse Obligations in a
Dialogue System
We have built a system that explicitly uses discourse
obligations and communicative intentions to partake in
natural dialogue. This system plays the role of the dia-
logue manager in the TRAINS dialogue system, which
acts as an intelligent planning assistant in a transporta-
tion domain. While this is a domain where the assump-
tion of co-operation is generally valid, the obligation
model still provides for a much simpler analysis of the
discourse behavior than a strongly plan-based account.
An example of a dialogue that the TRAINS system can
engage in is shown in Figure 1. Below we describe parts
of the discourse model in more detail and then show how
it is used to account for aspects of this dialogue.
The TRAINS System [Allen and Schubert, 1991] is
a large integrated natural language conversation and
plan reasoning system. We concentrate here, however,
on just one part of that system, the discourse actor
which drives the actions of the dialogue manager mod-
2This is a slightly simplified version of a spoken dialogue
between two people. The original is dialogue 91-6.1 from
[Gross et al., 1993]. The utterance numbering system used
here reflects the relation to the turn and utterance num-
bering used there. ‘3-7’ represents utterance 7 within turn
3. ‘=’ is used to indicate merged utterances. Thus ‘3-3=6’
spans four utterances in turn 3 of the original, and 9=13
replaces turns 9 through 13 in the original.
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Utt. # Speaker: Utterance
1 U: We better ship a boxcar of oranges to
Bath by 8 AM.
2 S : Okay.
3-3=6 U: So we need to get a boxcar to Corning
where there are oranges.
3-7 U: There are oranges at Corning.
3-8 U: Right?
4 S : Right.
5-1 U: So we need an engine to move the
boxcar.
5-2 U: Right?
6 S : Right.
7-1=2 U: So there’s an engine at Avon.
7-3 U: Right?
8 S : Right.
9=13 U: So we should move the engine at Avon,
engine E1, to Dansville to pick up the
boxcar there.
14 S : Okay.
15-2=4 U: And move it from Dansville to
Corning.
15-5=7 U: Load up some oranges into the boxcar.
15-8=10 U: And then move it on to Bath.
16 S : Okay.
17 U: How does that sound?
18-3 S : That’s no problem.
19 U: Good.
Figure 1: Sample dialogue2 processed by TRAINS-93.
ule. Figure 2 illustrates the system from the viewpoint
of the dialogue manager.
The dialogue manager is responsible for maintaining
the flow of conversation and making sure that the con-
versational goals are met. For this system, the main
goals are that an executable plan which meets the user’s
goals is constructed and agreed upon by both the sys-
tem and the user and then that the plan is executed.
The dialogue manager must keep track of the current
state of the dialogue, determine the effects of observed
conversation acts, generate utterances back, and send
commands to the domain plan reasoner and domain
plan executor when appropriate. Conversational action
is represented using the theory of Conversation Acts
[Traum and Hinkelman, 1992] which augments tradi-
tional Core Speech Acts with levels of acts for turn-
taking, grounding [Clark and Schaefer, 1989], and ar-
gumentation. Each utterance will generally contain acts
(or partial acts) at each of these levels.
Representing Mental Attitudes
As well as representing general obligations within the
temporal logic used to represent general knowledge, the
system also maintains two stacks (one for each conver-
sant) of pending discourse obligations. Each obliga-
tion on the stack is represented as an obligation type
❄
✛
❄
✻
❄
✛
✛
Modules
NL Interpretation
Observed
Intended
Conversation Acts
Manager
Domain Directives
NL Output
NL Input
Dialogue
Modules
Domain Task Interaction
Domain Observations
User
Conversation Acts
and Directive Responses
Module
NL Generation
Figure 2: Dialogue Manager’s High-Level View of the
Architecture of the TRAINS Conversation System
paired with a content. The stack structure is appro-
priate because, in general, one must respond to the
most recently imposed obligation first. As explained
in Section , the system will attend to obligations before
considering other parts of the discourse context. Most
obligations will result in the formation of intentions to
communicate something back to the user. When the in-
tentions are formed, the obligations are removed from
the stack, although they have not yet actually been met.
If, for some reason, the system dropped the intention
without satisfying it and the obligation were still cur-
rent, the system would place them back on the stack.
The over-riding goal for the TRAINS domain is to
construct and execute a plan that is shared between
the two participants. This leads to other goals such
as accepting proposals that the other agent has sug-
gested, performing domain plan synthesis, proposing to
the other agent plans that the domain plan reasoner
has constructed, or executing a completed plan.
The Discourse Actor Algorithm
In designing an agent to control the behavior of the dia-
logue manager, we choose a reactive approach in which
the system will not deliberate and add new intentions
until after it has performed the actions which are al-
ready intended. As shown above, though, new obli-
gations will need to be addressed before performing in-
tended actions. The agent’s deliberative behavior could
thus be characterized in an abstract sense as:
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loop
perceive world and update beliefs
if system has obligations
then address obligations
else if system has performable intentions
then perform actions
else deliberate on goals
When deciding what to do next, the agent first con-
siders obligations and decides how to update the inten-
tional structure (add new goals or intentions) based on
these obligations. Obligations might also lead directly
to immediate action. If there are no obligations, then
the agent will consider its intentions and perform any
actions which it can to satisfy these intentions. If there
are no performable intentions, then the system will de-
liberate on its overall goals and perhaps adopt some
new intentions (which can then be performed on the
next iteration).
For the discourse actor, special consideration must
be given to the extra constraints that participation in a
conversation imposes. This includes some weak general
obligations (such as acknowledging utterances by oth-
ers and not interrupting) as well as some extra goals
coming from the domain setting to maintain a shared
view of the world and the domain plans which are to
be executed. We prioritize the sources for the delibera-
tions of the actor as follows:
1. Discourse Obligations from Table 1
2. Weak Obligation: Don’t interrupt user’s turn
3. Intended Speech Acts
4. Weak Obl: Grounding (coordinate mutual beliefs)
5. Discourse Goals: Domain Plan Negotiation
6. High-level Discourse Goals
The implemented actor serializes consideration of these
sources into the algorithm in Figure 3.
(1) while conversation is not finished
(2) if system has obligations
(3) then address obligations
(4) else if system has turn
(5) then if system has intended conversation acts
(6) then call generator to produce NL utterances
(7) else if some material is ungrounded
(8) then address grounding situation
(9) else if some proposal is not accepted
(10) then consider proposals
(11) else if high-level goals are unsatisfied
(12) then address goals
(13) else release turn
or attempt to end conversation
(14) else if no one has turn
(15) then take turn
(16) else if long pause
(17) then take turn
Figure 3: Discourse Actor Algorithm
The updating of the conversational state due to per-
ceived conversation acts or actions of other modules of
the system progresses asynchronously with the oper-
ation of the discourse actor. Whenever the discourse
actor is active, it will first decide on which task to at-
tempt, according to the priorities given in Figure 3, and
then work on that task. After completing a particular
task, it will then run through the loop again, searching
for the next task, although by then the context may
have changed due to, e.g., the observance of a new ut-
terance from the user. The actor is always running and
decides at each iteration whether to speak or not (ac-
cording to turn-taking conventions); the system does
not need to wait until a user utterance is observed to
invoke the actor, and need not respond to user utter-
ances in an utterance by utterance fashion.
Lines 2-3 of the algorithm in Figure 3 indicate that
the actor’s first priority is fulfilling obligations. If there
are any, then the actor will do what it thinks best to
meet those obligations. If there is an obligation to ad-
dress a request, the actor will evaluate whether the re-
quest is reasonable, and if so, accept it, otherwise reject
it, or, if it does not have sufficient information to de-
cide, attempt to clarify the parameters. In any case,
part of meeting the obligation will be to form an in-
tention to tell the user of the decision (e.g., the accep-
tance, rejection, or clarification). When this intention
is acted upon and the utterance produced, the obliga-
tion will be discharged. Other obligation types are to
repair an uninterpretable utterance or one in which the
presuppositions are violated, or to answer a question.
In question answering, the actor will query its beliefs
and will answer depending on the result, which might
be that the system does not know the answer.
In most cases, the actor will merely form the inten-
tion to produce the appropriate utterance, waiting for
a chance, according to turn-taking conventions, to ac-
tually generate the utterance. In certain cases, though,
such as a repair, the system will actually try to take
control of the turn and produce an utterance immedi-
ately. For motivations other than obligations, the sys-
tem adopts a fairly “relaxed” conversational style; it
does not try to take the turn until given it by the user
unless the user pauses long enough that the conversa-
tion starts to lag (lines 14-17). When the system does
not have the turn, the conversational state will still be
updated, but the actor will not try to deliberate or act.
When the system does have the turn, the actor first
(after checking obligations) examines its intended con-
versation acts. If there are any, it calls the generator
to produce an utterance3 (lines 5-6 of the discourse ac-
tor algorithm). Whatever utterances are produced are
then reinterpreted (as indicated in Figure 2) and the
conversational state updated accordingly. This might,
of course, end up in releasing the turn. It might not be
convenient to generate all the intended acts in one ut-
3Actually, if the only utterance is an acknowledgement,
the actor will postpone the production until it checks that
there is nothing else that it can combine in the same utter-
ance, such as an acceptance or answer.
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terance, in which case there will remain some intended
acts left for future utterances to take care of (unless
the subsequent situation merits dropping those inten-
tions). Only intended speech acts that are part of the
same argumentation acts as those which are uttered
will be kept as intentions – others will revert back to
whatever caused the intention to be formed, although
subsequent deliberation might cause the intentions to
be re-adopted.
If there are no intended conversation acts, the next
thing the actor considers is the grounding situation
(lines 7-8). The actor will try to make it mutually
believed (or grounded) whether particular speech acts
have been performed. This will involve acknowledg-
ing or repairing user utterances, as well as repairing
and requesting acknowledgement of the system’s own
utterances. Generally, grounding is considered less ur-
gent than acting based on communicative intentions,
although some grounding acts will be performed on the
basis of obligations which arise while interpreting prior
utterances.
If all accessible utterances are grounded, the actor
then considers the negotiation of domain beliefs and in-
tentions (lines 9-10). The actor will try to work towards
a shared domain plan, adding intentions to perform the
appropriate speech acts to work towards this goal. This
includes accepting, rejecting, or requesting retraction of
user proposals, requesting acceptance of or retracting
system proposals, and initiating new system proposals
or counterproposals.
The actor will first look for User proposals which are
not shared. If any of these are found, it will add an
intention to accept the proposal, unless the proposal is
deficient in some way (e.g., it will not help towards the
goal or the system has already come up with a better
alternative). In this latter case, the system will reject
the user’s proposal and present or argue for its own pro-
posal. Next, the actor will look to see if any of its own
proposals have not been accepted, requesting the user
to accept them if they have been simply acknowledged,
or retracting or reformulating them if they have already
been rejected. Finally, the actor will check its private
plans for any parts of the plan which have not yet been
proposed. If it finds any here, it will adopt an intention
to make a suggestion to the user.
If none of the more local conversational structure con-
straints described above require attention, then the ac-
tor will concern itself with its actual high-level goals.
For the TRAINS system, this will include making calls
to the domain plan reasoner and domain executor,
which will often return material to update the system’s
private view of the plan and initiate its own new pro-
posals. It is also at this point that the actor will take
control of the conversation, pursuing its own objectives
rather than responding to those of the user.
Finally, if the system has no unmet goals that it can
work towards achieving (line 13), it will hand the turn
back to the user or try to end the conversation if it
believes the user’s goals have been met as well.
Examples
The functioning of the actor can be illustrated by its
behavior in the dialogue in Figure 1. While the dis-
cussion here is informal and skips some details, the
dialogue is actually processed in this manner by the
implemented system. More detail both on the dialogue
manager and its operation on this example can be found
in [Traum, forthcoming 1994].
Utterance 1 is interpreted as performing two Core
Speech Acts. It is interpreted (literally) as the
initiation4 of an inform about an obligation to perform
a domain action (shipping the oranges). This utterance
is also seen as (the initiation of) an (indirect) sugges-
tion that this action be the goal of a shared domain
plan to achieve the performance of the action. In ad-
dition, this utterance releases the turn to the system.
Figure 4 shows the relevant parts of the discourse state
after interpretation of this utterance.
Discourse Obligations:
Turn Holder: System
Intended Speech Acts:
Unack’d Speech Acts: [INFORM-1], [SUGGEST-4]
Unaccepted Proposals:
Discourse Goals: Get-goal Build-Plan Execute-Plan
Figure 4: Discourse Context after Utterance 1
After interpreting utterance 1, the system first de-
cides to acknowledge this utterance (lines 7-8 in the
actor algorithm) – moving the suggestion from an un-
acknowledged to unaccepted – and then to accept the
proposal (lines 9-10). Finally, the system acts on the in-
tentions produced by these deliberations (lines 5-6) and
produces the combined acknowledgement/acceptance of
utterance 2. This acceptance makes the goal shared and
also satisfies the first of the discourse goals, that of get-
ting the domain goal to work on.
Utterances 3-3=6 and 3-7 are interpreted, but not
responded to yet since the user keeps the turn (in this
case by following up with subsequent utterances before
the system has a chance to act). Utterance 3-8 invokes
a discourse obligation on the system to respond to the
User’s assertion in 3-7 and also gives the turn to the sys-
tem. The resulting discourse context (after the system
decides to acknowledge) is shown in Figure 5.
The system queries its domain knowledge base and
decides that the user is correct here (there are, indeed,
oranges at Corning), and so decides to meet this obli-
gation (lines 2-3) by answering in the affirmative. This
results in forming an intention to inform, which is then
4According to the theory of Conversation Acts
[Traum and Hinkelman, 1992], Core Speech Acts such as in-
form are multi-agent actions which have as their effect a
mutual belief, and are not completed unless/until they are
grounded.
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Discourse Obligations: (CHECK-IF (:AT ...))
Turn Holder: System
Intended Speech Acts: (Ack [INFORM-7], ...)
Unack’d Speech Acts:
Unaccepted Proposals: [SUGGEST-10], [SUGGEST-15]
Discourse Goals: Build-Plan Execute-Plan
Figure 5: Discourse Context after Utterance 2
realized (along with the acknowledgement of the utter-
ances) by the production of utterance 4.
Similar considerations hold for the system responses
6 and 8. The reasoning leading up to utterance 14 is
similar to that leading to utterance 2. Here the user is
suggesting domain actions to help lead to the goal, and
the system, when it gets the turn, acknowledges and
accepts this suggestion.
Utterances 15-2=4, 15-5=7, and 15-8=10 are inter-
preted as requests because of the imperative surface
structure. The discourse obligation to address the re-
quest is incurred only when the system decides to ac-
knowledge the utterances and ground them. After the
decision to acknowledge, the obligations are incurred,
and the system then addresses the requests, deciding
to accept them all, and adding intentions to perform
an accept speech act, which is then produced as 16.
Utterance 17 is interpreted as a request for evaluation
of the plan. When the system decided to acknowledge,
this creates a discourse obligation to address the re-
quest. The system considers this (invoking the domain
plan reasoner to search the plan for problems or incom-
plete parts) and decides that the plan will work, and so
decides to perform the requested action – an evaluation
speech act. This is then generated as 18-3. The dis-
course state after the decision to acknowledge is shown
in Figure 6.
Discourse Obligations: (ADDRESS [REQUEST-49])
Turn Holder: System
Intended Speech Acts: (Ack [REQUEST-49])
Unack’d Speech Acts:
Unaccepted Proposals:
Discourse Goals: Build-Plan Execute-Plan
Figure 6: Discourse Context after Utterance 17
After the user’s assent, the system then checks its
goals, and, having already come up with a suitable plan,
executes this plan in the domain by sending the com-
pleted plan to the domain plan executor.
This example illustrates only a small fraction of the
capabilities of the dialogue model. In this dialogue, the
system needed only to follow the initiative of the user.
However this architecture can handle varying degrees
of initiative, while remaining responsive. The default
behavior is to allow the user to maintain the initiative
through the plan construction phase of the dialogue. If
the user stops and asks for help, or even just gives up
the initiative rather than continuing with further sug-
gestions, the system will switch from plan recognition
to plan elaboration and incrementally devise a plan to
satisfy the goal (although this plan would probably not
be quite the same as the plan constructed in this dia-
logue).
We can illustrate the system behaving more on the
basis of goals than obligations with a modification of
the previous example. Here, the user releases the turn
back to the system after utterance 2, and the delibera-
tion proceeds as follows: the system has no obligations,
no communicative intentions, nothing is ungrounded,
and there are no unaccepted proposals, so the system
starts on its high-level goals. Given its goal to form a
shared plan, and the fact that the current plan (con-
sisting of the single abstract move-commodity action)
is not executable, the actor will call the domain plan
reasoner to elaborate the plan. This will return a list
of augmentations to the plan which can be safely as-
sumed (including a move-engine event which generates
the move-commodity, given the conditions that the or-
anges are in a boxcar which is attached to the engine),
as well as some choice point where one of several possi-
bilities could be added (e.g., a choice of the particular
engine or boxcar to use).
Assuming that the user still has not taken the turn
back, the system can now propose these new items to
the user. The choice could be resolved in any of several
ways: the domain executor could be queried for a pref-
erence based on prior experience, or the system could
put the matter up to the user in the form of an alterna-
tive question, or it could make an arbitrary choice and
just suggest one to the user.
The user will now be expected to acknowledge and
react to these proposals. If the system does not get
an acknowledgement, it will request acknowledgement
the next time it considers the grounding situation. If
the proposal is not accepted or rejected, the system
can request an acceptance. If a proposal is rejected,
the system can negotiate and offer a counterproposal
or accept a counter proposal from the user.
Since
the domain plan reasoner [Ferguson, forthcoming 1994]
performs both plan recognition and plan elaboration
in an incremental fashion, proposals from system and
user can be integrated naturally in a mixed-initiative
fashion. The termination condition will be a shared ex-
ecutable plan which achieves the goal, and each next ac-
tion in the collaborative planning process will be based
on local considerations.
Discussion
We have argued that obligations play an important role
in accounting for the interactions in dialog. Obligations
do not replace the plan-based model, but augment it.
The resulting model more readily accounts for discourse
behavior in adversarial situations and other situations
where it is implausible that the agents adopt each oth-
ers goals. The obligations encode learned social norms,
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and guide each agent’s behavior without the need for
intention recognition or the use of shared plans at the
discourse level. While such complex intention recogni-
tion may be required in some complex interactions, it
is not needed to handle the typical interactions of ev-
eryday discourse. Furthermore, there is no requirement
for mutually-agreed upon rules that create obligations.
Clearly, the more two agents agree on the rules, the
smoother the interaction becomes, and some rules are
clearly virtually universal. But each agent has its own
set of individual rules, and we do not need to appeal to
shared knowledge to account for local discourse behav-
ior.
We have also argued that an architecture that uses
obligations provides a much simpler implementation
than the strong plan-based approaches. In particular,
much of local discourse behavior can arise in a “reactive
manner” without the need for complex planning. The
other side of the coin, however, is a new set of problems
that arise in planning actions that satisfy the multiple
constraints that arise from the agent’s personal goals
and perceived obligations.
The model presented here allows naturally for a
mixed-initiative conversation and varying levels of co-
operativity. Following the initiative of the other can
be seen as an obligation driven process, while lead-
ing the conversation will be goal driven. Represent-
ing both obligations and goals explicitly allows the sys-
tem to naturally shift from one mode to the other. In
a strongly co-operative domain, such as TRAINS, the
system can subordinate working on its own goals to
locally working on concerns of the user, without neces-
sarily having to have any shared discourse plan. In less
co-operative situations, the same architecture will allow
a system to still adhere to the conversational conven-
tions, but respond in different ways, perhaps rejecting
proposals and refusing to answer questions.
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